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O. 00477
28 February 1956

To : Project Chief
FROM : O-63
SUBJ : Meeting with Mr. JAKOBSEN
on 17 February 1956.

Contact Report

WHAT IS APPROPRIATE?

1. O-63 telephoned O-65 on 17 February 1956 at 0815 hours to call DAGMAR Military 628 and, giving his name as DONOWHUE, to ask for Mr. DAHLCK and tell him that he (DONOWHUE) would come to DAGMAR at about 1000 hours.
2. O-63 reached DAHLCK by phone from the Project office, and was told to come to the main gate of the US Army station in DAGMAR and call DAHLCK from there.
3. At 1030 hours O-63 arrived in DAGMAR in O-65's official car and was picked up by a civilian, about 25 years old, who asked him to follow his car. They drove to a building in the backyard. There he met Mr. DAHLCK, who asked him for his identification. O-63 had no document in the name of DONOWHUE, and he therefore refused to produce his AGO Card. DAHLCK told him that he should procure himself some identification papers from the office (The Project), and introduced him to a man, about 30 years old, whose name was not given but whose telephone number is 656 (Barmfelder Nr. 656). It seemed to O-63 that this man was in a higher position than DAHLCK, and he produced his AGO Card, certifying the man. Mr. 656 was satisfied and began to explain how O-63 could get into touch with DAHLCK. He stated first of all that The Project should have known that DAHLCK was not available the morning, being interrupted by someone else. O-63 could reach him in the afternoon, however, at 1300 hours, at the US Consulate in BREMEN, room 720, which is Mr. LINDNER's office. In case of difficulties, O-63 was to call DAGMAR Military 656.
4. O-63 drove back to KUNZIGEN and obtained KUNZIGEN's agreement to go to the US Consulate. Before going there O-63 called DAHLCK to inform him that DONOWHUE was not available that afternoon and that one BILLIKEN would go in his stead. DAHLCK promised to inform Mr. 656, as the latter was not present at the time. He said he did not see why Mr. BILLIKEN should have any difficulties with Mr. LINDNER.

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5. At 1100 hours O-6 came to room #20 at the US Consulate and asked for Mr. BELAIEF. An elderly lady told him that she did not know anyone by that name. O-6) waited outside, having in mind the possibility that BELAIEF was not a true name and that the person concerned had forgotten to inform his secretary that someone would come to ask for a Mr. BELAIEF and that she should send him in. After 20 minutes O-6) estimated that all the employees had returned from lunch, but no one had entered room #20. He therefore called #56, but without result (there was no answer).
6. O-6) returned to the office and informed KREWITZ of the latest development. He was instructed to call PRACTIC man here and ask for an explanation. Mr. BELAIEF held that there would be no error and that Mr. BELAIEF must be in room #20 at the Consulate. He spelled the name to KREWITZ who then also gave O-6) the page and line of the telephone directory (page 38, line 18) where the name appears, with additional information indicating "US Consulate employee".
7. O-6) went to the US Consulate a second time. Another secretary was there, but she also said that Mr. BELAIEF was not known to her. She pondered a while, and then asked whether O-6) did not mean Mr. BELAIEK (spelling not known to O-6)). O-6) said yes, and asked her to call Mr. BELAIEK (feeling sure that an error had been made). Mr. BELAIEK came out of his office, and O-6) told him that he had come on behalf of Mr. IRVING of DCM/US to interview a man. BELAIEK asked whether O-6) had come from PRACTIC NY/N. O-6) replied in the negative. When he saw that BELAIEK was embarrassed by this, however, he said that he had come through PRACTIC. This calmed BELAIEK, and he said that he knew what it was about.
8. O-6) was taken to room #20 where another man, evidently the Consulate interpreter, was introduced to him. The man asked O-6) to return in five minutes. O-6) did. PRACTIC was not present. While waiting for him, the int. reviewer gave O-6) some information on KREWITZ's background and assured O-6) that it was not necessary to give PRACTIC any financial reward for that day's interrogation as he had already taken care of it, giving him \$10. O-6) thanked him, and they parted as soon as KREWITZ entered the interrogation room.
9. The interrogation of KREWITZ lasted from approximately 1600 hours to 1715 hours. O-6) had to cut short the interrogation because all the employees of the Consulate were leaving the building.

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10. None.

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11. In view of the fact that O-6) met KREWITZ in the late afternoon, he decided not to concentrate on any particular objective, but tried to create a friendly atmosphere by asking KREWITZ questions about his personal affairs. This caused KREWITZ to talk about himself. KREWITZ began with his im-

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prisoners. He was sentenced to 17 years forced labor in 1945 as a former deputy for the Nazi Party. Later his sentence was commuted to 11 years. From 1945 to 1955 he was imprisoned in numerous camps all over the GDR and not many people. In this connection HESWITZEN mentioned the famous POW (he referred to him as "Tschick"), who gave him a very important and top secret message to be delivered only to the top US Intelligence Agency in FRANKFURT/L. "I hope that you are the right person", HESWITZEN said, and explained to Q-63 that the entire message consisted of a password, namely "MOLDAVIA-BERLIN". Q-63 told HESWITZEN that the right person would have sent this message. Q-63 did not know whether this password made any impression on him, and asked HESWITZEN to list other prominent fellow prisoners he had met. He then showed HESWITZEN a list of names supplied by MISHAK, and asked him which of them were known to him. HESWITZEN knew PLATE, WOLF, and was almost sure to have heard of KURDACH.

12. Only then changed the subject and asked HESWITZEN whether he knew of any fellow prisoners to whom the CIA would have offered rehabilitation. HESWITZEN knew of two prisoners who had accepted this offer to work for them in West Germany. HESWITZEN himself had rejected such an offer. Q-63 did not ask for any details but told HESWITZEN that he would return to this matter later.
13. The meeting ended after Q-63 made arrangements with HESWITZEN regarding the next meeting.

Source : During the discussion with HESWITZEN, Q-63 mentioned that he was handling a man of high-level-cave intelligence with considerable knowledge of up-to-date international political events, who was familiar with the situation in the GDR, and in particular with the situation in GDR prisons. These qualities and the good impression that HESWITZEN made on Q-63 led him to the conclusion that it would be worth while to have HESWITZEN thoroughly interrogated by the Project's Experts Section. The interrogator would have to be well prepared for the interview. See also paragraph II of this report.

Personality : Please see the following individual are requested :

Josef KIRCHHOF of EBERSV. T.R.Y., now in West Germany. He helped HESWITZEN to get into touch with the GDR authorities. They knew each other from the 30's and met by chance on the train as HESWITZEN traveled to HESWITZEN.

Health :

14. Mr. PLATE is being treated for a light case of cancer of the skin, which he probably developed while working in the uranium mines in the GDR. For this reason he travels from SCHLEICHEN to KERNICH three times a week. He does not have a job yet, and has not decided what to take up.

Employment :

None.

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INSTRUCTIONS :

17. The next meeting is scheduled for 20 February 1956 at 0800 hours in the SKIFSKORN HUT restaurant in KOBLENZ.

SECRETARY :

18. MRUZIKOV emphasized several times during the interview that he does not want to become an agent of the AID. His only desire is to help in the struggle against communism by delivering to the right people the messages given to him by SOFOR and by giving all the information and experiences he gathered during his stay in the GDR.
19. The second point stressed by MRUZIKOV was his request that the relation between him and the AID be kept secret from the Soviet authorities and SOFOR.
20. MRUZIKOV showed G-43 the halved page of a calendar which had been given to him on the GDR/German border, by the GDR authorities to serve as identification for some people who were to contact him later. To date he had not been approached by anyone.

SOME OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS :

21. G-43 feels that MRUZIKOV should be interrogated in detail on the following points:

- All details concerning AID's origins, and the "roll-back" underground movement in GDR prisons and camps
- CR report : interrogation of his experiences with the GDR efforts of collaboration, and the people who accepted or rejected such offers
- Detailed interrogation on his opinion of the people in the GDR in general, on what the present GDR politicians think of present political developments, suggestions and complaints of GDR citizens regarding the fight against Communism, etc.

The points listed sub (a) and (b) should be handled by G-43 or other other operational agent. Point sub (c), which G-43 considers to be the most important one, should be handled by someone from the Soviets because experienced in political matters. The result of this interrogation would not serve any operational purpose, but there are not many chances of hearing the opinions of above sources and the Project should take advantage of it.

22. As to the CR report, G-43 does not believe that MRUZIKOV is an AID agent and considers him to be an honest, intelligent and well educated man of strong anti-Communist tendencies.

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